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4 
Introduction 
 
The ink on the enlargement Treaty of the European Union had not even dried, when 
policy-making in the new EU was already confronted by its first crisis over the 
common foreign policy on Iraq and relations with the USA. The division into “new” 
and “old” Europe is an early warning of problems the European Union will face after 
enlargement to 25 member states in May 2004. The heterogeneity of economies and 
cultures, views, preferences and policy objectives will prevent efficient policy-making, 
unless the future European Constitution establishes institutions and procedures that 
will involve European citizens in the formation of collective policy. The pace of 
European integration has accelerated in recent years. A single market with a single 
currency has produced an increasing number of collective public goods. These areas 
of common policy concern are Europe’s ‘res publica’. They require new forms of 
governance, which I call a European Republic. The in-depth analysis can be found in 
the study prepared for the Bertelsmann Foundation: Stefan Collignon, The European 
Republic: Reflections on the Political Economy of a Future Constitution. The Federal 
Trust, London, 2003. This text summarises the main arguments. 
 
 
I. The Looming Crisis in the EU 
 
European integration has been one of the great success stories of the 20th century. 
Emerging from the turmoil of two world wars, its purpose has been to preserve peace 
and prosperity for European citizens. By integrating markets and creating common 
policy institutions, Europe’s citizens individually, and governments collectively, have 
also developed new forms of co-operation across borders. These new common 
practices have strengthened mutual respect and trust between European citizens, 
thereby contributing to the perception of common interests, if not identity, and to the 
convergence of broad policy objectives. Examples of this process have become 
apparent in the policy consensus on price stability leading to EMU, or in the recent 
popular opposition to the war in Iraq. But Europe has now attained a critical junction: 
Either it will consolidate its achievements in lasting democratic institutions, or the 
centrifugal forces of an enlarged Union will pull it apart again. The changing 
international context, the problems of collective action in large groups and the 
democratic frustration of Europe’s citizens require the leap to a Constitution ensuring 
Europe’s capacity to act. Otherwise, policy gridlock, Eurosclerosis and 
indecisiveness will gradually erode European integration. Without substantial 
increases in the democratic legitimacy of European policy-making procedures and 
institutions, the efficient management of Europe’s common concern’s will not be 
sustainable. I will first sketch out some broad trends in world developments, which 
will pose new challenges for policy-makers and then discuss the link between 
legitimacy and efficiency. Against this background we will be able to ask which forms 
of governance or policy-making regimes will be appropriate for meeting the 
challenges. In the second part I will draw the conclusions and implications for a 
European Constitution.  
 
The Changing Context of EU Policy-making 
 
The global context within which European integration has taken place is changing. 
This structural transformation, due to population growth, technological change and 
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the dynamics of globalisation and the disappearance of the bipolar world, will 
profoundly affect the international power distribution.  
 
At the end of World War II, 2.5 billion people were living on this planet. Today there 
are more than 6 billion and that number will increase to over 9 billion by 2050. These 
people need to be fed and their claims on natural resources will increase 
significantly. As a consequence, the number and the intensity of distributive conflicts 
in the world, often with recourse to military force, will also augment. Furthermore, 
these tendencies will cause large migrations across continents, exert disintegrating 
pressures on traditional cultures and societies and lead to violent and fundamentalist 
reactions. If Europeans want to live in peace, they will need to have the means to 
deal with these questions. 
 
Population growth will not affect all regions in the world uniformly. Europe’s 
population will shrink from 481 to 424 million. The EU15 share of the world´s 
population will fall from 6 percent as it stands today, to 3½ percent by 2050 (8 
percent to 4½ percent for EU 27, excluding Turkey). This will not only marginalize 
Europeans in the world, but also create serious problems at home for the distribution 
of income and wealth in an aging society. Moreover, technological progress and 
globalisation will transform economic structures, with dynamic growth poles strongly 
concentrated in Asia. 
 
Figure 1. Estimated World Population in 2050 
 
Yet, the most formidable challenge to European policy-making will probably result 
from the enlargement of the European Union. Policy-making along the current lines 
of intergovernmental bargaining will become increasingly complex in a Union of 25 or 
more members. This would be less dramatic if most member states had similar policy 
preferences, but the high heterogeneity in economic, political and social conditions 
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between the old and new members is reinforcing potential conflictuality between 
countries as we have recently seen in the area of foreign policy and military 
procurement. This danger is even larger, as US-foreign policy is no longer supporting 
the unification of Europe but recurs to ‘divide et impera’. Against this backdrop, the 
simplistic assumption that popular approval of the EU depends mainly on citizens’ 
prosperity may easily turn out to be a strategic and counterproductive error.  
 
Summing up the challenges resulting from Europe’s changing international 
environment and enlargement will require a growing number of tasks and functions to 
be carried out efficiently only at the EU-level because individual member states do 
not have the means to manage them separately. In order to improve Europe’s 
capacity to act, however,  the European Union will have  to improve its democratic 
legitimacy.  
 
In democracies, citizens tolerate conflict over policies and accept the frustration of 
their preferences because they trust that their institutions are fair. They believe that 
they have a reasonable chance of convincing others about their own policy objectives 
in the process of public policy deliberation. Yet, the institutions and processes of 
policy-making in the European Union today are not conducive to create this 
foundation of trust, because European policy deliberation takes place between 
governments and administrations and not between citizens. Therefore, more 
democracy is needed in order to create loyalty toward European institutions.  
 
Within this context, it is fashionable today to identify more democracy with 
decentralisation and subsidiarity. Greater proximity of decision-making to citizens 
would reflect different cultural backgrounds and heterogeneous preferences. 
However, this approach does not address the question of potential disagreement and 
conflict between local communities and national political constituencies, nor how 
policy preferences emerge and are changed through policy debates. As a 
consequence subsidiarity is hijacked by national bureaucracies who try to preserve 
national preference heterogeneity in order to legitimise their own power. This 
undermines both the efficiency and legitimacy of European policy-making. In order to 
understand how these problems can be overcome, it is necessary to review some 
theoretical concepts. This will allow us to distinguish between policy competences 
which need to be conferred to the European level and those which can produce 
efficient provisions of collective goods through voluntary policy coordination between 
autonomous nation-states. The hurried reader, who is not interested in the foundation 
of my arguments, may jump to part III. 
 
The Efficiency of European Policy-making 
 
The efficiency of governance regimes is often assessed in terms of policy output in 
the form of collective goods and welfare and the cost of deliberative input into 
decision-making. The two are linked through the principle of equivalence. The 
consequences of a policy decision should reflect the preferences of those who are 
affected by the decision. The equivalence principle states that the jurisdiction 
providing specific public goods should cover all those citizens who are potential 
consumers of these goods. All in all, this principle was realised in the traditional 
nation-state, although the recent developments of globalisation and European 
integration have started to undermine its reality: (1) policy externalities have broken 
the correspondence between decision-makers and affected citizens i.e. the decision 
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by one administration may affect citizens living in other jurisdictions. We find this 
phenomenon most frequently in the European context, where progress in integration 
makes people more dependant on each other. (2) heterogeneous preferences 
between groups of citizens often lead to inconsistencies in public choices, unless 
appropriate institutions are established. If people cannot agree on substance, they 
must at least agree on procedures if violence is to be prevented. Policy externalities 
contribute to what I call type-I-inefficiencies, while type-II-inefficiencies are related to 
preference heterogeneity as a consequence of the constitutional policy framework. 
 
Type-I-inefficiencies 
 
The incidence of collective goods depends on their function. While the construction of 
a hospital may primarily affect the local community, the building of a highway may 
have consequences with larger geographical impact. Starting from this observation, 
the theory of fiscal federalism has provided coherent criteria for assigning 
competencies to different levels of jurisdiction. For our purposes we will call all those 
goods and policies potentially affecting all European citizens European collective 
goods, while regional goods remain restricted to national or local communities. I will 
also call the set of people affected by a policy the ‘policy domain’. Thus, the 
European policy domain is determined by European collective goods. Yet, policy 
decisions are taken with respect to political constituencies. The principle of 
equivalence demands that there should be a correspondence between policy domain 
and political constituency. Hence, decisions on European collective goods must be 
taken at the level of a European constituency and not by national governments 
accountable to national constituencies. 
 
Inefficiencies arise, when policy decisions are taken in the context of a given 
jurisdiction or polity, but the polity and the scope of its competences is smaller than 
the range of its policy consequences. By polity we mean the system of institutions, 
norms and rules that are set up by constitutions and represent a given constituency. 
The failure to take into account the cost and benefits conferred to citizens of other 
jurisdictions may then lower welfare. 
 
Type-I-inefficiency in policy-making is therefore similar to the externality problem of 
private markets (for example when a firm causes pollution to its neighbours). But 
while markets allow to internalise externalities by compensating the damaged party, 
policy externalities need to be internalised by deliberate ex-ante policy co-ordination. 
This means effectively enlarging the polity to the extent of the policy domain. 
European collective goods need a European jurisdiction and therefore also a 
European legislator who is responsible to a European constituency. This does not 
necessarily mean that all European collective goods must be provided by a 
centralized European government. But given that all European citizens are potentially 
affected by European collective goods, citizens must be involved in the deliberation 
of their collective preferences if policies are to be democratically legitimate. 
 
Type-II-inefficiencies 
 
However, the broadening of the policy domain is only justifiable if it includes all 
potentially affected citizens. This may cause another set of inefficiencies. For, if the 
polity remains fragmented into segregated constituencies between different member 
states, policy co-ordination between national governments will cause preference 
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frustration. The academic literature calls this fragmentation phenomenon ‘multilevel 
governance’, where the objectives of national governments reflect the preferences of 
their constituency, while they bargain for compromise solutions at the European 
level. Yet, the negotiated equilibrium solution, “minimising the loss function”, will 
usually frustrate at least some, if not all national policy preferences. For ordinary 
citizens a loss is a loss, even if minimised. Hence, the system is not efficient in 
linking the provision of European collective goods to low cost of decision-making. 
 
In order to overcome this dilemma, it is useful to observe how policy objectives are 
formed in democracies. Political preferences emerge from democratic debates on 
arguments, in which citizens listen to each other. Voters elect those who’s claims 
they find reasonable. Even if this debate does not always take place in the glaring 
light of a European public sphere as described by Habermas, the simple fact that 
individuals are connected within their society and give varying weight and respect to 
each others’ arguments will ultimately lead to a convergence of their views and 
preferences. I have called this phenomenon ‘stochastic consensus’. It describes 
consensual policy preferences as a potential equilibrium view, which would be 
achieved after a sufficiently long process of deliberation.  
 
Stochastic consensus does not exclude the possibility of disagreement (dissent) in 
societies where individuals are connected and respect each other, while the process 
of deliberation is still ongoing. Only if people refuse to give each other respect will 
communication break down and open conflict would prevail. This is exactly what 
European integration was supposed to overcome. However, even if open conflict is 
avoided, persistent dissent can cause inefficiencies for policy-making. For such 
disagreement makes rational choice in a strict sense impossible: because there are 
diverging preferences on policy objectives, one cannot choose “the” option with the 
highest utility. Someone must impose a solution, but this would violate the preference 
of others. Avoiding this violation of democracy requires consensual decision-making 
by unanimity, but this rule may prevent efficient decisions all together if dissent 
persists. The alternative is majority voting.  If consensus exists on procedures such 
as voting, violent conflict may be avoided. Voting represents a second best method 
of decision-making, because decisions are taken, although by frustrating minorities. 
Consensual voting often implies that citizens can rationally expect to shift the policy 
consensus at least in the future (“the next election”). Such justified belief is the 
foundation of fairness that legitimates institutions. 
 
The problem with European governance today is that the institutional arrangements 
make the shift of European collective preferences rather unlikely. At best it will take a 
long time, which is also inefficient. The reason is simple. Because policy debates 
take place primarily within the honey-comb of nation-state constituencies, citizens 
deliberate and debate policy options in view of national elections. This is where their 
voice is heard, where their input matters. They charge their governments to represent 
these national objectives at the European level. Thus, the crucial feature in this 
system is that European citizens are not connected in their policy debates and do not 
or hardly give respect and weight to the arguments advanced in other countries. 
Consequently, the degree of policy dissent at the European level is significantly 
higher than at the national level and this causes type-II-inefficiencies in European 
policy-making. The structure of Europe’s fragmented polity leads to a structural, 
quasi-permanent experience of policy preference frustration. European citizens 
believe that decisions taken “by Brussels” do not reflect their own concerns, while 
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they know little of the policy debates in other countries. The declining approval of 
European integration by Europe’s citizens (from 70 percent in the 1980s to below 50 
percent today), while the range of collective goods has significantly broadened, is a 
telling manifestation of this trend. In the long term, it could endanger the consensus 
on which European integration has been built. 
 
Subsidiarity, Community Method and Voluntary Policy Coordination 
 
Many academic observers and political actors have sought to overcome the dilemma 
of externalities versus preference heterogeneity by reverting to the subsidiarity 
principle: according to the EU Treaty, the European level “shall take action only if and 
insofar as the objectives be better achieved by the Community”, and “shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty”. Thus subsidiarity 
would reduce type-II-inefficiencies, but simultaneously it would increase type-I-
inefficiency. Some authors have formulated this dilemma as a trade-off between two 
evils, where decentralised policy-making is preferable, presumably because it carries 
a higher degree of legitimacy. They claim that if European policy action is then 
undertaken voluntarily by national governments, it will more easily reflect their 
constituencies’ preferences. However, the other side of this logic is that if 
governments cannot agree, no decision is made and this may be inefficient. 
 
Voluntary policy coordination has become particularly prominent since the Lisbon 
European Council in 2000 turned the failure of agreeing on common policies into a 
virtue by calling voluntary participation the ‘open method of coordination’. Yet, there 
is a serious problem with this approach because decentralisation to lower level 
jurisdictions does not only increase the scope for policy externalities, but it also 
decreases the likelihood for European collective goods to be provided at all, or at 
least to an optimal amount. The reason is the so-called ‘collective action problem’ 
explained first by Mancur Olson (1971). This argument shows that for a wide range of 
collective goods the likelihood of their optimal provision will decrease as the number 
of members in a group increases. Hence both the enlargement of the EU to new 
members, and the justification of the subsidiarity principle to keep policy 
competences at the national level would increase the number of decision-makers in 
the European Union and thereby reduce the EU’s capacity to provide efficient policy 
output. 
 
Olson’s paradox of collective action is that large groups, composed of rational 
individuals, will not act in their group interest. For policy-making in the enlarged EU it 
implies that the voluntary policy coordination and cooperation between autonomous 
governments is not necessarily optimal. The answer would be to centralise European 
policy-making at the EU level. Traditionally such centralisation has taken place 
through the conferral to community institutions (Commission, ECB) or through so-
called hard and binding forms of policy coordination (e.g. Stability and Growth Pact). 
However, the argument must be qualified. There does actually exist a range of 
European collective goods where voluntary policy coordination may be sufficient for 
their efficient provision. The defining criterion is the character of their externalities. It 
can be shown that voluntary policy coordination can be efficient in providing so-called 
inclusive collective goods, while the collective action problem will prevent this for 
exclusive goods. In the first case, policy-making competences can be shared 
between Member States. In the second must the European Union have exclusive 
competences. 
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Inclusive collective goods 
 
The classical definition of public goods is that (1) they must be provided in the same 
amount to all the affected consumers (jointness of supply) and (2) that everyone 
must consume the same amount of the good (non-rivalness for consumption). 
However, as figure 2 shows, the concept of collective goods is larger. If only 
condition (1) holds but not (2), the collective good is called an inclusive club good; in 
the opposite case it is an exclusive common resource. Collective goods, 
characterised by different externalities, require different forms of governance. The 
crucial distinction lies in the nature of expectations formed by autonomous actors and 
their implications for interactive equilibria. 
 
Figure 2. Typology of Collective Goods 
 
 
Olson (1971) has shown that the club goods in box III of figure 2 are inclusive in the 
sense that (below a given capacity limit) an existing club may increase the total 
benefit from membership by admitting new members. The recent literature on 
network externalities has also observed the positive correlation between benefits and 
the number of group members under certain conditions. For example, the value of 
my membership in a Tennis club may increase when I can draw on a larger pool of 
potential partners to play with. Similarly, a large European Union with a single 
currency provides greater opportunities for trade. In this case the benefits of 
individual members are complementary to each other.  
 
Yet, the positive spillover of a given common policy into any individual jurisdiction will 
only take place, if all individual governments were sufficiently convinced that their 
marginal contribution to the common policy will have a positive effect on their own 
constituency. Otherwise, they would abstain from making the effort of producing the 
policy outcome. Hence, collective preferences between autonomous actors will 
converge, if there is sufficient information and trust about the intentions of other club 
members. This is exactly what the soft policy coordination regimes are supposed to 
achieve: increased flow of information, exchange of best practices, peer pressure are 
all mechanisms to “tip” a policy network away from an initial sub-optimal equilibrium 
and move it to a higher welfare equilibrium. This logic has two implications: (1) 
Voluntary policy coordination and adherence to soft guiding rules will be forthcoming, 
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if and only if a soft institutional structure ensures the “tipping” of the preference 
convergence. (2) The group of decision-makers can then also be large, as network 
externalities increase the incentive to provide these collective goods. Hence 
voluntary and soft policy coordination are the appropriate regimes for the provision of 
inclusive collective goods. 
 
Exclusive collective goods 
 
However, the case is different for exclusive collective goods, i.e. common resource 
goods (box II in figure 2). Policy coordination for exclusive collective goods is 
hampered by so-called strategic substitutabilities, which cause Olson’s collective 
action problem. They are caused by two different forms of externalities. (1) Although 
consumption of exclusive collective goods is the same for all group members, their 
access (supply) is rival, meaning that the share of benefits for each group member 
falls as the number of participants increases. As a consequence, the feedback on the 
expectations of existing group members is negative. The individual marginal benefit 
for a new or deviating member of the group is positive, but for existing or conforming 
members it is negative. Thus, there exists an incentive to go against collective 
interest (such as the Stability and Growth Pact), insofar as existing members’ 
willingness to pay for collective goods will be reduced as the number of group 
members increases. Hence, the likelihood for a large group to provide an exclusive 
collective good voluntarily will disappear. (2) Because benefits are the same for all 
group members, but supply is rival, it is possible to externalise production costs to 
others and free-ride. For example, if most countries in a monetary union balance their 
budgets, everyone may benefit from lower interest rates. But the free-rider could 
benefit from low interest rates “produced” by other member-states’ collective fiscal 
restraint and this creates an incentive for individual non-compliance with the policy 
rule. Therefore hard forms of policy coordination or even, as in the case of monetary 
policy, conferral to a European authority are required in order to provide these 
collective goods efficiently. The argument applies with force to the aggregate fiscal 
policy stance, but also to a range of other policy coordination issues, including 
foreign and security policy.  
 
The two points can interact. The zero-sum game quality attached to common 
resource goods provides an incentive to keep the group of collective decision-makers 
small, for otherwise one risks the non-provision of the collective good. But if the 
group is enlarged, the provision of collective goods will be reduced and ultimately 
cease. Hence, voluntary intergovernmental policy coordination will not be sufficient to 
provide large groups of countries with an efficient or optimal amount of collective 
goods. A consistent approach to policy coordination for such goods requires “hard” or 
binding regimes of governance. 
 
Hence the nature of collective goods decides which form of European governance is 
most efficient. Inclusive collective goods can be provided optimally by voluntary 
policy coordination and shared competences between EU member states, exclusive 
goods require exclusive competences at the European level. The efficient 
assignment of policy competences does not depend on taste. It is dependent on the 
nature of the collective good. 
 
In practical terms, the distinction is not always easy. It seems that most of the policy 
areas covered by the Lisbon Process and the Open Method of Coordination fall 
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under the heading of inclusive goods. But the literature on fiscal federalism has also 
clearly established that aspects of macroeconomic stabilisation policy (price stability, 
interest rates, exchange rates and, in Euroland, the definition of the aggregate fiscal 
policy stance) are dominated by the strategic expectations related to exclusive 
collective goods. However, if exclusive competences at the EU-level may increase 
the efficiency of policy-making, they also pose a major challenge for the democratic 
legitimacy of policy-decisions at the EU-level. This has important implications for the 
drafting of a European Constitution.  
 
 
II. The Democratic Challenge 
 
Efficient policy-making in the European Union requires forms of governance that 
eliminate or at least minimise the two types of inefficiencies described above. We will 
now look at how this can be achieved. 
 
Shifting the Trade-off between Type-I and Type-II Inefficiencies 
 
Our discussion of type I and II inefficiencies has shown that the structure of the 
European polity determines the nature and size of policy inefficiencies. If the polity is 
fragmented and reflects the preferences as they are deliberated in unconnected 
national constituencies, as proposed by the subsidiarity principle, the policy-making 
process may well appear ‘close to the people’, but the resultant large externalities will 
prevent the sufficient provision of exclusive European collective goods. Hence 
subsidiarity will minimize type-II-inefficiencies and maximise type-I-inefficiencies. 
Alternatively, if the externalities are ‘internalised’ by intergovernmental policy 
coordination in a ‘two-level governance’ process type-I-inefficiencies will be 
minimised, but democratic preference frustration will undermine the legitimacy of the 
institutions.  
 
A poignant example of this dilemma is the debate around the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), which has assigned fiscal policy competences to the national level, while 
Euroland stabilisation policies require the definition of an aggregate European fiscal 
stance as a benchmark for stability orientated monetary policy. By stipulating that 
each government should keep its budget position ‘in balance or surplus’ over the 
medium term, the SGP effectively determines the aggregate stance to be equally ‘in 
balance or surplus’. However, this poses a problem to democratic legitimacy. In 
recent years an increasing number of national governments have been elected with 
programs which are inconsistent with the commitment to balanced budgets. It seems 
inconceivable that the rigid budget rules of the SGP are sustainable in the long run, 
for a fundamental tenet of democracy is: ‘No taxation without representation’. Voting 
citizens will not accept for ever, that they vote for one thing and get another because 
some previous government has committed them to different policy options. As we 
saw, the possibility of preference change is inherent to fair and democratic 
institutions. To preclude preference change means violating the norms on which 
European unification is built. The dilemma results from the fact that preference 
change only takes place in the context of national constituencies, while national 
policy decisions would affect everyone else. 
 
The answer is to unify the national polities by forming a single European 
constituency, within which the policy preferences for European collective goods are 
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formed. This integrated polity would assume the competences to deal with all policies 
which potentially affect all European citizens. This implies the European Constitution 
must establish a proper European government capable of taking decisions with 
regard to all exclusive European collective goods exercising the shared competences 
for spillovers between national and European goods. National authorities unwilling to 
confer their competencies seem to be unaware that they have already lost a large 
part of their power because of the widespread policy externalities in an integrated 
economy. 
 
Does setting up such a government imply the creation of a European ‘super state’? 
Not, if we mean by that the coercive imposition of an uncontrolled Leviathan. Private 
spheres need to be protected by fundamental rights and the public sphere must be 
freely and equally accessible to each citizen. But when externalities of exclusive 
public goods exist, they need a system of governance, which is able to police 
deviating behaviour consistently. The solution to the dilemma of collective action 
consists in appointing a democratically accountable government that is itself subject 
to sanctions by voters (the sovereign) if it does not sanction others. As a 
consequence, the European constitution must clearly stipulate that it is European 
citizens and not national governments who are the primary source of political 
legitimacy. 
 
Creating Structures for Democratic Policy Deliberation 
 
It is often asserted that a European democracy is not possible because a European 
demos does not exist. ‘People’ – rather than ‘citizens’ – are characterised by the 
cultural background and historic traditions in which they live. It is claimed, that this 
“identity” prevents them from agreeing on collective European preferences. However, 
people also change. Human beings are capable of learning. They listen to each 
other, evaluate new evidence and change their prior views and assessments. In 
order to make this process of deliberation an instrument of European integration, a 
constitution must create institutions which structure political debates such that a 
European-wide policy consensus can ultimately emerge. As I pointed out above, this 
requires that individual citizens are connected and extend mutual respect to each 
other. 
 
A democratic polity creates exactly these conditions. Governments are accountable 
to their voters and compete with opposition parties for the trust of their constituency. 
Citizens are connected through their rights as the voting (and sanctioning) sovereign 
and through the public debates and deliberations that precede the election. 
Consequently, constitutional arrangements determine the speed of preference 
change leading to policy consensus. How should a European polity be structured? It 
can be shown that in a stylised intergovernmental system, national polities and 
constituencies are separate and only connected through government representatives 
at the European level. Hence, policy disagreement between member states is highly 
persistent. Alternatively, in a European Republic with a single constituency all 
citizens are directly connected because they need to elect a European government 
that manages their collective goods. Here, policy consensus emerges most rapidly. 
Today’s ‘community method’ is a hybrid intermediary case, where the European 
Commission facilitates the flow of information and the degree of trust between 
governments, but derives no direct legitimacy from citizens. This arrangement is 
useful for the provision of inclusive collective goods, when network externalities 
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provide the potential for convergent policy action. But it is inappropriate for exclusive 
collective goods, when national preferences are not converging. A unified approach 
is then required to provide the collective goods. 
 
The need to elect a common government would automatically broaden the chain of 
respect and trust among citizens across borders, because the policy debates in other 
regions would become relevant to every individual’s assessment of different policy 
options. Even if dissent on substantive policy issues prevailed – as it does in most 
democracies – the efficiency of European policy-making would be strengthened by a 
European-wide constitutional consensus about procedures, because it would bring 
individual citizens into the deliberation process. The alternative model of making 
states – rather than citizens – the ultimate source of political legitimacy would not 
only perpetuate policy disagreement between ‘people’, but it is also founded on pre-
democratic norms and forms of government. 
 
 
III. Practical Implications for the European Constitution 
 
Our analysis has a number of practical consequences for the drafting of a democratic 
European Constitution. Some of these conclusions may appear too radical for today’s 
intellectual climate, but at least they can serve as benchmarks giving direction to 
smaller pragmatic steps. I will first outline some of the more ambitious orientations, 
and then present some concrete steps for implementation. 
 
The Value Content of Europe’s Constitution 
 
One issue is the normative content of a European Constitution. Although there 
seems to be consensus that the democratisation of institutions is desirable, there is 
disagreement as to the need of going beyond procedural rules. From the political left 
there is a demand to enshrine the model of a social market economy, or a Social 
Union in the constitution. The political right resists such attempts.  
 
The political values of modernity are expressed in the universal values of the 
republic: liberté, égalité, fraternité. Even if this is a French articulation, their essence 
is incorporated in all modern democracies. Yet, these three slogans do not only 
establish the dimensions of the modern political space, they also formulate a ranking 
of these values which is relevant for the economy.  Individualism and markets are 
based on the predominance of two fundamental principles: freedom and equality. 
They are derived from the norms of modern contractual economies. Without freedom 
and equality neither contracts nor individual rights are possible and all social relations 
would be subject to the principle of hierarchy. By contrast, the value of fraternité 
(brotherhood) reflects traditional, holistic ideologies. They survive in the modern 
context either as communitarian values, often with reference to ethnic or cultural 
communities, or in the hierarchical institutions of the state. European integration is 
clearly grounded in the principles of a market economy and a European Constitution 
must therefore reflect the values of modern society as they emerged from the 
enlightenment philosophy. This does not imply disrespect for references to religion 
and other cultural traditions, but these pre-modern values must remain secondary to 
the political affirmation of the republican principles of freedom and equality. It is 
therefore consistent with the political objectives of the European Union to affirm 
human dignity, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights as the 
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Union’s values, but the principle of equality of citizens should also be cited here 
explicitly. (The draft EU Constitution only mentions the equality of citizens in article 
33). Furthermore, the integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
individual citizen is also an expression of and not, as argued by some, a contradiction 
with the economic principles of a monetary market economy. Hence, a Constitution 
that protects European citizens against holistic claims by governments and 
communities, whether national or European, and protects the formal and substantive 
equality of their individual rights must be part of the normative content of a European 
Constitution.  
 
By embracing individual freedom and equality as the fundamental norms, a 
democratic European Constitution does not necessarily have to take a position with 
respect to these twin principles of modernity. Traditionally, these have been the 
guiding stars of the political right and the political left in democratic societies. 
Economic liberals emphasise the freedom of entrepreneurship, while social-
democrats emphasise the substantive equality between individuals that is easily lost 
under the dynamics of unfettered markets. Thus, for the political right a European 
Constitution must preserve the functioning of efficient markets. For the left, high 
levels of employment and social protection are a substantive condition of political 
equality and economic freedom. In modern democracies, policy preferences swing 
between these two major poles reflecting the outcome of different weights of 
arguments in public policy deliberations. It would be wrong to limit the outcome of 
these deliberations by constitutional norms, although it is essential that both  
fundamental norms are acknowledged by the Constitution. For only respect for the 
freedom and equality of citizens allows consensual policy preferences to emerge. 
 
The Question of Borders 
 
Another open question is where the borders of the Union are to be drawn? Often this 
is addressed in terms of geography. Some claim that geo-strategic objectives of 
stabilising Europe would require the accession of Turkey first, followed by the 
Ukraine, Russia and others later. Undoubtedly, these are countries in need of 
stability. But it may be wise to remember Napoleon who had learned a lesson when 
he said: 
 
“Empires die of indigestion.” 
 
The limits of the European Union appear by the auto-selection of those who want to 
play by Europe’s constitutive rules. These rules must be structured in such a way that 
they enable coherent and efficient policy-making by providing desired collective 
goods and legitimacy into the policy process. Those who do not like these rules 
should not be part of the republic. 
 
Setting up a European Government 
 
A European constitution must establish an European Government, democratically 
elected by a unified constituency and able to decide on European collective goods 
and policies in an efficient way. As a consequence, political debates and policy 
deliberation are focussed on the election of this government. Naturally, the 
Commission should assume this function and be elected by and accountable to the 
European Parliament.  
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However, this only makes sense if it has powers to act and a President who provides 
orientation for the general policy direction. Otherwise, why should European citizens 
bother to vote? It is therefore incompatible with a modern constitution that the 
President of the Commission is pre-selected by the European Council. Such 
practices belong to pre-democratic aristocracies, where the Upper House controlled 
the Commons. The right to legislate and grant or withhold public goods must be 
subject to universal suffrage of the citizens concerned. 
 
Furthermore, the Commissioners must be responsible for the provision of specific 
European collective goods. The Commission’s services and staff are the 
administration of such a political executive.  It therefore should be the responsibility 
of the Commission President and not the Council to establish who is in charge of 
what and whether regional interests are sufficiently represented and balanced by the 
composition of this body.  
 
The European Parliament 
 
If the Commission is to become a European executive, it needs democratic control. 
This is the key task for the European Parliament. It must therefore have the right to 
vote the Commission in and to revoke it. For only the European Parliament has a 
proper European constituency. Policy debates in this Parliament would not only 
directly reflect the policy preferences of European citizens, they would also contribute 
to their formation. In order to support this process, political equality between all 
citizens needs to be ensured. It is therefore desirable that the same electoral law 
applies to all member states. Of course, the accountability of Commissioners to 
Parliament would contribute to politisation of European policy-making. But this is a 
desired side-effect, for it is likely to increase public participation in policy debates 
throughout Europe. Founding the legitimacy of the European government on the 
European Parliament is therefore simultaneously creating and reinforcing a European 
public sphere and ultimately the European identity. 
 
The Council 
 
Even if there are European collective goods, which can clearly be distinguished from 
national goods, there is also a wide range of interdependences and spillovers from 
national to European goods. Here is the role for the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers. The Council should become a second legislative chamber, co-
deciding with the European Parliament on European laws. However, the executive 
orders and directives of this European legislation should be left to the authority of the 
European Commission, which is accountable to the European Parliament but may 
delegate its implementation to national authorities. This would greatly simplify the 
procedures of European legislation by taking away the bureaucratic bargaining 
between national administrations over the detailed application of European legislation 
that contributes to much over-regulation and bureaucratisation in the European Union 
today.  
 
A difficulty in the delimitation of tasks between a new-style Commission and member-
states relates to joint tasks, when there are spillovers from one level to the other. 
This is therefore where the European Council and the Commission could jointly 
assume certain executive functions. But who would be the driving force? 
Traditionally, this has been a function of the EU Presidency. Several ideas have been 
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put forward for the reform of the EU presidency. The essential question is: Which 
system is most likely to strengthen Europe’s constitutional consensus? The present 
system of rotating presidencies in the EU has the advantage of re-enforcing mutual 
respect across Europe, as each presidency makes special efforts to prove its 
European commitment. In peripheral countries, this is a beneficial side effect and 
helps mobilizing public interest for European affairs. However, the short durations 
(six months) are a handicap. A more permanent administrative structure may be 
needed for policy issues requiring continuity, which is best provided by the 
administrative services of the Commission, although certain political decisions may 
be reserved to the European Council. In this case one could preserve the rotating 
presidencies of the EU to allow member-states to provide impetus into certain policy 
areas.  
 
The Congress  
 
A European government must be in charge of European collective goods. However 
the delimitation between European and national collective goods is not always clear. 
Given the changing nature of collective goods, policy competences may change 
character over time. The draft EU Constitution assigns ‘the flexibility’ clause to the 
European Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission after 
assent from the European Parliament. Using an alternative approach, one might 
assign the responsibility for deciding at which level policy decisions should be taken 
to a European Congress, consisting of an equal number of members of national and 
European Parliaments. This Congress would therefore be the authority of last resort 
in constitutional rule setting and have the competence of competence transfers. The 
function of a Congress is also important in case the Constitution now under 
discussion does not go far enough to guarantee efficient policy-making. The 
Congress could then authorize constitutional amendments without having to entirely 
re-write the Constitution. This approach would give the Congress a clearer mission 
than the presently envisaged Congress of the Peoples of Europe. 
 
Voting and Equality  
 
Political equality implies, every country’s voting rights would represent its population 
share, so that each individual has the same weight. In the EU, this is not the case. 
The EU has a bias in favour of small member states. Malta and Luxembourg with 
less than half a million people and less than one per mille of the EU27 population 
have over ten times as much voting power in the Council and over eight times the 
representation in the European Parliament than they deserve for their population 
share. Germany with 19 percent of the population has only half that weight in the 
Council and only 13.5 percent of the seats in Parliament. How serious are these 
distortions? 
 
One way to measure inequality is the Gini coefficient.1 Table 3 shows that political 
equality is fairly evenly distributed in the EU, although the Gini coefficient for Council 
representation is nearly twice as high as for the EP. This fact emphasises our point 
that the Council is a representation of national administrations, not citizens. The 
inequality is justified if, and only if, the Council represents member state 
                                                   
1 This coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents perfect equality, and 1 total inequality. Thus, 
‘one (wo)man, one vote represents a coefficient of zero, ‘all communities are equal’ implies a 
coefficient of one. 
 18
governments and their interests, rather than citizens and their preferences. The 
Council should therefore have legislative competencies that are relevant to national 
collective goods and their interdependence with European policies, not for policies 
that are relevant for the provision of European collective goods over the entire 
European policy domain.  
 
Whether this inequality justifies changing the voting weights at some future point 
should be open for debate. But the proposal of introducing an unweighted double 
majority of member-states and population as the criterion for qualified majority voting 
in the Council would certainly increase the efficiency of the decision-making process. 
However, a simpler and more transparent legislative procedure would be to obtain a 
simple majority in the (legislative) Council and the European Parliament for co-
decision between these two bodies. This would guarantee a double majority of 
countries and citizens, and improve the transparency of arguments in the process of 
policy deliberation.  
 
Table 3. Gini Coefficient for Political Inequality 
 
 
Gini Coefficient 
 
Council 
 
European Parliament 
 
EU15 
EU27 
 
0.291 
0.282 
 
0.149 
0.160 
 
 
IV. Implications for an Efficient Economic Governance 
 
Our analysis of European collective goods has shown that inclusive goods with 
network externalities can be provided efficiently by voluntary cooperation between 
governments. The Open Method of Coordination, which was part of the Lisbon 
Strategy, is the appropriate instrument to deal with these goods. It applies to policy 
areas where joint action is an incentive to participate, for example in developing  the 
knowledge society, e-Europe etc. However, the range of policies, where national 
preferences are persistent and collective goods are exclusive, is far more extensive 
than often acknowledged. It covers in particular most aspects of macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies in the single currency area, but also many structural reforms 
where selective incentives on a national basis prevent policies that would benefit the 
Union as a whole. Hence a strengthening of Europe’s economic governance is 
required and I will now discuss some of these aspects. 
 
Europe’s Future Financial Constitution 
 
Establishing the European Commission as a proper European government 
necessitates that it has command over its own resources. Because in democracies 
there can be ‘no taxation without representation,’ a financial constitution for the 
European Union requires: 
 
1. Full budget authority for the European Parliament, on both the 
income and expenditure side. This does not exclude the possibility 
that the Council may have co-decision rights with respect to certain 
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issues, but the autonomy of a European government is indispensable 
for the efficient provision of European collective goods.  
 
2. The European Parliament must have the authority to authorise the 
Commission to raise European taxes. The principle of jurisdictional 
congruence requires such taxing capacities to be subject to full 
accountability to the representation of European citizens at the level 
of the European Parliament. A European tax does not necessarily 
imply heavier tax burdens for European citizens. Part of the funds 
raised for a European budget would substitute transfers that were 
previously coming from national budgets. They may therefore even 
reduce the tax burden in some countries, especially when they are 
net-contributors to the EU budget. The Council is the forum where 
distributional transfer issues must be discussed and decided jointly 
with the Commission.  
 
The criteria for choosing the appropriate tax base must be related to the European 
single market with the purpose of avoiding distortions. In practical terms, this refers to 
goods and capital markets:  
 
1. On goods and services, a proportion of VAT could be assigned to 
the European level while member states collect the other part. The 
European VAT rate would be uniform throughout the single market 
(say 2 percent) whilst national rate variations would reflect local 
policy preferences.  
 
2. The uniform taxation of highly mobile factors of production, such 
as capital, is also imperative in order to prevent distorting and unfair 
tax competition. However, other taxation can and should remain 
under the authority of national governments, as harmful tax 
competition is unlikely to take place in this domain. Decisions of 
occasional reallocations of the tax base between the European and 
the national level would be decided by the European Congress.  
 
Macroeconomic Governance  
 
With the advance of monetary integration a large share of Europe’s collective goods 
relates to stabilisation policies. Because macro-economic policies and financial 
stability resemble exclusive collective goods, economic theory has long argued that 
stabilisation policy and financial regulation must be operated at the central level. This 
principle has been applied to monetary policy by the creation of the European Central 
Bank and therefore there is no need to change the institutional arrangements in this 
area. However, because of the collective action problems discussed above, an 
independent intergovernmental structure will not produce optimal results for 
economic and budget policy. These tasks should be conferred to the European 
Commission, which would be accountable to all European citizens.  
 
Yet, even if the European Commission controlled its own budget, its size will remain 
too small for the foreseeable future to become an efficient tool of stabilisation policy. 
Hence a more efficient mechanism for the determination of the optimal 
macroeconomic policy mix is required.  
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Defining aggregate fiscal policy 
 
The definition of the aggregate fiscal policy stance, i.e. the determination of 
aggregate European expenditure and revenue programs, is an exclusive collective 
good because liquidity borrowed under the single currency constraint is a common 
resource. But the allocation of government spending is a different matter. Most of the 
expenditure by public authorities concerns local and national collective goods whose 
benefits do not necessarily spill over into other countries. It is true that there are 
some large-scale European investment projects like transport networks, strategic 
research or expanding information and communications technology, but the bulk of 
spending is on public goods which are consumed in a local or regional environment. 
Fiscal federalism has assigned the allocation function for such goods to 
decentralized levels, while macroeconomic stabilization is to be decided centrally. In 
Europe a large EU budget does not seem politically feasible, nor is it necessary. 
What matters for the optimal policy mix is the amount of government net spending, 
wherever it may originate. This means that the allocation of collective goods is not 
necessarily a European function, although the financing restriction makes the 
aggregate fiscal stance an exclusive European good. Hence, the budgeting may be 
done bottom up from the national and regional level, while the aggregate fiscal policy 
stance needs to be set at the European level (top down).  
 
The main problem is how to allocate the different expenditure and income shares to 
national governments. My suggestion to solve the policy mix problem is to confer the 
function of setting the macroeconomic fiscal policy stance to the European 
government and leave the formulation of the specific spending (and revenue) 
chapters to national governments. The idea of separating the two functions is already 
part of budget practices in several European countries, notably France and Italy. 
France’s Parliament first votes for a given macroeconomic stance, then proceeds to 
so-called arbitrages between the different titles. In Italy, Parliament first votes the 
Documento di Programmazione economico-finanziara (DPEF), indicating the targets 
of budgetary policy over the following three years and their relevance for inflation, 
growth and employment. A few months later, budgetary policy is implemented by the 
Legge Finanziaria (Finance Act), containing the provisions of the national budget and 
implementing legislation (appunto di accompagnamento). The coherence of the 
aggregate fiscal policy stance in Europe could be achieved by developing the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines into a ‘European DPEF’ in the form of a “European 
framework law”.  
 
The process of fiscal policy-making 
 
Fiscal policy-making in Europe would then be a process going through several steps.  
 
1. The European Commission would formulate the fiscal policy stance for the whole 
of the Euro-area in view of the requirements of the business cycle, inflation 
perspectives, the international environment, economic growth etc. It may therefore 
flexibly adjust deficit levels to the business cycle. This aggregate deficit may also 
reflect different national debt positions, and allows therefore greater regional flexibility 
than the present Stability and Growth Pact.  
 
2. To ensure that this document will indeed reflect the collective policy preferences of 
the European constituency, the integrated European budget plan, formulated as a 
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“framework law”,  would have to be debated, amended and voted by the European 
Parliament. Because all proposals and amendments are public, this would fuel a 
European-wide debate on the policy orientations and provision of collective goods. 
Institutionally, however, the process of deliberation would by definition transcend the 
national framework and connect citizens. Hence, transparency would contribute to 
the emergence of collective European budget preferences. 
 
3. After the vote in the European Parliament, the fiscal framework law goes to the 
Council for approval. At this point, arbitrages between national governments under 
the constraint of the aggregate position are possible. But given that the overall 
revenue and spending levels are now fixed, one government could only have a larger 
share in spending and deficits, if another country accepted a smaller share. Hence, 
the European Government, with the approval by the European Parliament, fixes the 
overall ‘envelope’ of public finance, but the execution is left to national authorities. It 
is the aggregate fiscal stance that is then relevant for monetary policy and the 
European Central Bank. 
 
4. At this point, the question of budget share allocation arises. Three different 
approaches for assigning national deficit quota are possible: intergovernmental 
bargaining, a transfer union or a market solution.  
 
(1) With intergovernmental bargains the Ecofin Council would become 
a clearing house for different national claims. The drawback is that the 
annual haggling for budget shares is messy and would hardly 
contribute to a coherent pan-European view of fiscal policy or to the 
strengthening of the legitimacy of political choices. 
 
(2) Alternatively the European Union’s budget could be expanded to the 
size of a federal budget, as in most developed federations. Such 
arrangement does not necessarily imply a large budget at the level of 
central government, but it requires at least a system of 
intergovernmental grants and transfers. This solution does not seem to 
find much support in the EU.  
 
(3) A third solution would be the creation of tradable deficit permits, as 
suggested by Casella (1999, 2001). The idea is derived from the 
experience in environmental markets where fishing or pollution rights 
are traded. These markets create property rights for exclusive public 
goods. Public authorities in EMU-countries would be allowed to trade 
rights to deficit creation after an overall ceiling (the aggregate policy 
stance) and an initial distribution of permits (for example corresponding 
to GDP-shares) has been agreed. The virtue of the scheme lies in the 
definition of property rights for deficits, allowing the internalisation of 
fiscal externalities and creating an incentive to minimize costs. Such an 
arrangement fits perfectly into the idea that a European government 
should be in charge of defining the aggregate fiscal policy stance (a 
collective good), while national governments are responsible for 
allocating taxes and expenditure. If any individual jurisdiction, be it a 
national government, or a regional or local authority or the European 
government, wishes to issue more debt than is initially allocated, it 
would have to buy permits from another authority which does not wish 
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to use its own quota. Hence, buying permits carries costs that need to 
be compared with the political costs of domestic fiscal consolidation. 
This is exactly the debate that should be going on in national or local 
parliaments. Hence, the ‘envelope approach’ would allow for the flexible 
adjustment of the aggregate ceiling in accordance to changing 
economic requirements. The stabilization function of public finance 
would be centralized at the European level, as postulated by the theory 
of fiscal federalism. The allocation through the market mechanism 
distributes the responsibility for fiscal rectitude in the most efficient 
manner across different countries at minimum cost.  
 
Practical first steps 
 
The recommendations made in this report may seem too ambitious and far reaching 
for a full implementation today. The constitutional consensus has not sufficiently 
converged to make governments accept the conferral of their sovereign powers to a 
European Government. If this is politically not feasible today, the European 
Constitution should at least create structures that open the way in this direction. 
Three minimum requirements are: 
 
(1) The European Union has to obtain the status of a single legal 
personality that makes policy decisions within a unified legal 
framework. This framework must contain a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of European Citizens. EU laws should be passed by the 
European Parliament in co-decision with the Council where 
appropriate. Secondary legislation on implementing policies should 
be left to the Commission, but could be delegated to national 
authorities where appropriate. 
 
(2) The European Commission President should be elected by the 
European Parliament by simple majority. The President should 
nominate Commissioners for task-orientated portfolios, not as country 
representatives. The Council may approve of them, but not appoint 
them. Parliament should be elected by a uniform electoral law. 
 
(3) The Commission must have its own financial resources. Both 
revenue and expenditure ought to be approved by the European 
Parliament. Certain items may be subject to co-decision with the 
Council. 
 
With respect to Europe’s economic governance, some simple steps allow to go 
beyond the closed shop of intergovernmental policy-making. By making co-decision 
between the Council and the European Parliament the dominant principle, policy 
decisions would become more transparent and policy debates focused on the 
European Parliament would contribute to a more rapid convergence to a European 
policy consensus. For this reason, I suggest making the existing Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines, article 99 (2,4), the emergency clause, article 100 (1,2), the no 
bail-out clause, 102 (2), 103 (3), the excessive deficit procedure 104 (6,7,14) and 
some provisions in ECB statutes, 107 (6) subject to co-decision (see annex). 
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Resumée 
 
The main points of this report are simple. 
 
1. The changing international and European context requires that a European 
Constitution creates efficient structures for the governance of European collective 
policy goods. 
 
2. Voluntary cooperation and coordination between autonomous governments is 
unlikely to provide European citizens with the collective goods they desire 
because of the so-called “collective action problem”. Only a limited range of 
inclusive goods with network externalities will be supplied by this approach. 
 
3. The principle of subsidiarity and the enlargement of the European Union are likely 
to exacerbate this problem. 
 
4. The solution is more centralisation and conferral of European policy-making to the 
EU-level. But this can only be justified if a European Government (i.e. the 
Commission) is fully accountable to European Citizens – rather than 
governments. Hence, the Commission must be elected by the European 
Parliament alone. Efficiency and legitimacy go together.  
 
5. A desired side-effect of the creation a European Government is the politicisation 
of policy debates that will help to create a pan-European policy consensus. 
Hence, decision-making will become more efficient, as national governments are 
less likely to hold up the legislative process. 
 
6. These changes are of particular relevance for the economic governance of 
European Monetary Union, as stabilisation policies are clearly a matter for 
centralisation. The Commission must take over the responsibility of defining 
European policies. Citizens must have the right to sanction the Commission if it 
does not reflect their preferences. National governments (or the European 
Council) cannot fulfil this function as they are not accountable to the European 
constituency as a whole. A final remark applies to the ratification of the 
Constitution. 
 
7. Given that constitutional consensus is the most important foundation for efficient 
European policy-making, the ratification procedures must support the emergence 
of such consensus. Several models are imaginable. 
 
(1) The ratification of the European Constitution can be submitted to 
national referenda. But if votes are only counted at the level of 
member state constituencies, as has been customary in previous 
EU-treaty referenda (Denmark, France, Ireland, UK), this method re-
enforces the communitarian honey-comb logic. The European Union 
will be perceived as belonging to member-states, rather than to its 
citizens. 
 
(2) Alternatively, the constitution could come into force after a pan-
European referendum has approved it. The Constitution would 
automatically become valid in countries that have approved it. If this 
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is in contradiction to national constitutions, parliamentary ratification 
procedures would follow after the pan-European referendum. If the 
population of a specific country does not vote in favour of the new 
constitution, it should have the right to participate nevertheless, if a 
minimum threshold of EU member states is reached, or to opt out. 
Of course, this requires appropriate procedures to deal with the opt-
outs.  
 
(3) Another option would be ratification of the constitution by a 
European Congress, consisting of an equal number of national and 
European parliamentarians. This solution gives national parliaments 
a greater say in important European policy decisions. However, the 
drawback of this method is that it does not necessarily mobilize 
cross-border public debate, deliberation and commitment, unless it 
is linked to a major election, say of the European Parliament. Also, 
given that this method may be incompatible with national 
constitutions, it may have to be reserved for constitutional 
amendments after the new constitution has been ratified. 
 
Non-ratification of the Constitution should be treated as a voluntary withdrawal from 
the Union. 
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Annex 
 
Proposal to strengthen the co-decision right of the European Parliament in the 
section on economic and monetary policy 
 
In what follows, first the old article based on the existing treaties and amended by the 
Convention’s legal service is quoted. A short explanation is given as to why the old 
text in the Treaty on European Union needs to be changed. This is then followed by 
the proposed new wording. 
 
 
Art. 99 (2) old text: “The Council shall on a recommendation from the Commission, 
formulate by a qualified majority a draft for the broad guidelines of the economic 
policies of the Member States and of the Union, and shall report its findings to the 
European Council.” 
 
· The proposal of the working group on economic governance (CONV 
357/02, p.5) recommended: 
“…It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.” 
 
However, art. 13 (1) of the Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional 
Treaty (CONV 528/03) states: “The Union shall coordinate the 
economic policies of the Member States, in particular by establishing 
broad guidelines of these policies.” The Union means not only the 
Member State but also participation of the European Parliament. 
Therefore the co-decision procedure has to apply. 
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“On the basis of this recommendation, the European Parliament and the Council in 
accordance with the legislative procedure, shall adopt a recommendation…” 
 
 
Art. 99 (4) old text: “Where it is established, under the procedure referred to in 
paragraph 3, that the economic policies of a Member State are not consistent with 
the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2 or that they risk jeopardising the 
proper functioning of economic and monetary union, the Council may, on a 
recommendation from the Commission, adopt by a qualified majority the necessary 
recommendations, which it shall address to the Member State concerned. The 
Council may on a proposal from the Commission, decide by a qualified majority to 
make its recommendation public. 
 
The President of the Council and the Commission shall report to the European 
Parliament on the result of the multilateral surveillance...” 
 
· The participation of the European Parliament is necessary to ensure 
that the common interest is taken into account (Art. 13 (2) of the Draft 
of Articles). 
 
Proposed new text… 
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“…the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with the legislative 
procedure may, on a recommendation of the Commission, adopt the necessary 
recommendations…” 
 
 
Art. 100 (1) old text: “Without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the 
Constitution, the Council on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt by a 
qualified majority the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if 
severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products.” 
 
· The co-decision procedure has to apply to enhance transparency. 
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“…the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with the legislative 
procedure on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt the measures…” 
 
 
Art. 100 (2) old text: “Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously 
threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disaster or exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control, the Council on a proposal from the Commission, may 
adopt by qualified majority a European decision granting, under certain conditions, 
Union financial assistance to the Member State concerned. The President of the 
Council shall inform the European Parliament of the decision taken.” 
 
· Instead of only informing the European Parliament the co-decision 
procedure should apply due to a question concerning the EU budget. 
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“…the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with the legislative 
procedure on a proposal of the Commission, may adopt a European decision…” 
 
 
Art. 102 (2): “The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt by a 
qualified majority the measures specifying definitions for the application of the 
prohibition referred to in paragraph 1. It shall act after consulting the European 
Parliament.” 
 
· This proposal is in line with the recommendation of the working group 
on simplification. The consultation procedure can be applied to this 
provision due to its eminently technical nature (CONV 424/02, p.16). 
 
· However, the process of setting up the rules demands transparency 
and thus the co-decision procedure should apply. 
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“ The European Parliament and the Council according to the legislative procedure, on 
a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt the measures…” 
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Art. 103 (2) old text: “The Council on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt 
by a qualified majority measures specifying definitions for the application of the 
prohibition referred to in (Art. 101) and in this Article. It shall act after consulting the 
European Parliament.” 
 
· This proposal is in line with the recommendation of the working group 
on simplification. The consultation procedure can apply to this 
provision due to its eminently technical nature (CONV 424/02, p. 16). 
 
· However, the process of defining the application of the prohibition in 
Art. 101 demands transparency.  
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“ The European Parliament and the Council according to the legislative procedure, on 
a proposal from the Commission, may adopt measures…” 
 
 
Art. 104 (6) old text: “The Council shall, on a recommendation from the Commission, 
having considered any observation which the Member State concerned may wish to 
make and after an overall assessment, decide by a qualified majority whether an 
excessive deficit exists.” 
 
· The risk of Member State hold-ups is reduced and the common 
interest ensured by engaging the European Parliament with the co-
decision procedure.  
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“ The European Parliament and the Council according to the legislative procedure, on 
a recommendation from the Commission, having considered…decide whether an 
excessive deficit exists.” 
 
 
Art. 104 (7) old text: “The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall 
adopt by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of its members, weighted in accordance 
with (Art. 205 (2)), excluding the votes of the representative of the Member State 
concerned, the European decisions and recommendations referred to in paragraphs 
8 to 12.” 
 
· The risk of Member State hold-ups is reduced and the common 
interest ensured by engaging the European Parliament with the co-
decision procedure.  
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“ The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission after the assent of the 
European Parliament, shall adopt by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of its 
members, weighted in accordance with (Art. 205 (2)), excluding the votes of the 
representative of the Member State concerned, …” 
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Art. 104 (14) old text: “The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt 
unanimously the appropriate measures to replace the said Protocol. It shall act after 
consulting the European Parliament and the ECB.” 
 
· The change of the rules about the excessive deficit procedure is such 
an important issue of common concern that it has to be decided by 
co-decision. 
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“ The Council, on a proposal from the Commission after the assent of the European 
Parliament, shall adopt unanimously the appropriate measures to replace the said 
Protocol. They shall act after consulting the ECB.” 
 
 
Art. 107 (6) old text: “The Council shall adopt the measures referred to in Articles 4, 
5.4, 19.2, 20, 28.1, 29.2, 30.4, and 34.3, of the Statute of the ESCB. It shall act by a 
qualified majority, either on a proposal from the Commission after consulting the 
European Central Bank, or on a recommendation from the European Central Bank 
after consulting the Commission. In both cases, it shall act after consulting the 
European Parliament.” 
 
· Transparency demands to apply the co-decision  procedure 
concerning these measures. However the change to the co-decision  
procedure means that the ECB would lose its power of 
recommendation under the current procedure. 
 
Proposed new text… 
 
“…The European Parliament and the Council shall act according to the legislative 
procedure, on a prior recommendation of the European Central Bank, after 
consulting the Commission.” 
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